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n April 18, 2008, Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman signed Legislative Bill 
LB1116 into law, requiring that by 2010, the Nebraska State Fair move from 
its historic location on 250 acres adjacent to the University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln to the center of the State in Grand Island. In turn, the bill transferred the property 
to the University for the purposes of creating Nebraska Innovation Campus. The bill 
was enacted in the Nebraska Unicameral with only 3 dissenting and 2 abstaining votes, 
but that did not reflect the intense controversy that led up to its passage.
The University along with several in-
fluential business leaders in Lincoln initi-
ated the proposal. The State Fair Board 
strongly objected. As a statutorily desig-
nated member of the State Fair Board, I 
quietly stopped attending the Board’s 
meetings. The original proposal would 
have moved the State Fair to another site 
in Lincoln but, in the end, an agreement 
was negotiated in which the $50 million 
cost of moving the Fair was borne in var-
ious amounts by the City of Grand Island, 
the State, the University, and the Fair.  
As a Fair Board member I knew the 
condition of the fair grounds. No signifi-
cant investment had been made there for 
decades as attendance at the Fair had 
consistently declined. The buildings were 
in a sad state of decay, some were no 
longer open to the public. The utility in-
frastructure, including water, sewer, and 
electricity, needed significant upgrades. 
It was clear to me and others that the 
Fair Board had neither the resources nor 
the revenue to invest in the property and 
the future of the Fair itself was in jeop-
ardy. But tradition in Nebraska dies hard. 
Notwithstanding that since the move the 
State Fair has prospered in Grand Island 
far beyond anyone’s imagination, there 
are those who mourn the loss of the Sep-
tember event in Lincoln as well as the 
economic benefits it was assumed to 
bring to the city. 
So why would the University em-
broil itself in such a controversy and, 
more significantly, why would business 
leaders in Lincoln as well as the City itself 
support the legislation? And why would 
the Legislature come eventually to over-
whelmingly support adoption of the bill? 
The reason was the prospects of what a 
new Innovation Campus could do for the 
University and the economic future of 
both the City of Lincoln and the State of 
Nebraska. 
Our proposal, certainly not in itself 
unique, was to create a research and tech-
nology park designed to attract private 
sector companies to locate adjacent to the 
University to engage in joint research or 
other relationships with the University. 
We predicted that the University would 
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occupy one-third of the campus and pri-
vate sector companies or amenities 
would occupy two-thirds. Because of the 
flood plain issues, of the 250 acres, ap-
proximately 120 acres are available for 
development, allowing for approxi-
mately 2 million square feet of leasable 
building space.  
We predicted that the campus could 
generate 5000 jobs and would take from 
15 to 20 years to develop. While compa-
nies from any sector would be welcome 
as long as they had a relationship with 
the University, the priority themes of the 
campus would be “food, fuel, and water” 
reflecting the obvious strengths of the 
University and the primary economic 
drivers of Nebraska. 
During the legislative process I often 
argued that the infrastructure on the 
property was obsolete and the Fair had 
no resources to replace it. With the trans-
fer of the property to the University I dis-
covered, unfortunately, that I had been 
right about the infrastructure and I was in 
no better financial position. However, we 
were able to select a private developer 
who was willing to make some initial in-
vestments, as well as utilize TIF financing 
to move the project forward.  
To date, we have opened two build-
ings with office space and a conference 
center. Two more food science laboratory 
buildings and a set of green houses are 
under construction. With the exception of 
the Conference Center, all buildings are 
owned by and leased from the developer. 
We have signed our first major private 
sector tenant, ConAgra Foods, who will 
expand its joint research with our Food 
Science Department, a department we in-
tend to move in its entirety to Innovation 
Campus. 
From the outset we understood that 
we could not attract private sector com-
panies to locate on a property that was 
managed by the State and subject to the 
associated regulatory processes. We cre-
ated the Nebraska Innovation Campus 
Development Corporation, an independ-
ent 501(c)(3) company managed by a 
Board of Directors, a majority of whom 
were from the private sector. NICDC has 
a ground lease from the University’s 
Board of Regents for the entire property 
and is the contracting party with the de-
veloper or with any future tenants. Thus, 
the commercial relationships between 
NICDC and the private companies are 
shielded from public records laws and 
other public regulations. 
In addition to traditional partner-
ships with the private sector, two addi-
tional facilities are planned for Innova-
tion Campus. The first, an accelerator for 
start-up companies, will be designed to 
give a short-term boost to enhance the 
prospects for success of early stage com-
panies. 
The second is what we are calling a 
“Maker Space.” Conceptually, it will be a 
space with a variety of tools, equipment, 
and supplies that will allow students, fac-
ulty, or community members to join a 
“Maker’s Club” and then to use the facil-
ity to “make stuff.” We announced a stu-
dent “Maker’s Club” and within three 
months it is the largest student organiza-
tion on campus with over 400 members. 
We hope this, and other activities, will 
create a real innovation culture that will 
spread to the rest of the university. 
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So, what does all of this have to do 
with the future of university research? At 
the risk of stating the obvious, it seems to 
me there are at least three trends that 
must be accounted for as we plan our re-
search future. 
First, there is the macroeconomic 
phenomenon that, while innovation is a 
major driver for economic growth, most 
public companies are withdrawing from 
investments in basic research. Driven by 
the market demands of quarterly income 
statements as a determinate of stock 
price, long-term investments without 
short term returns are problematic. And 
there is nothing more long-term or uncer-
tain as basic research. Yet, companies also 
understand they must position them-
selves to access research that has com-
mercial value and that research takes 
place largely within universities. Thus 
there are market forces that make univer-
sity-private sector partnerships essential. 
Second, the continued level of fed-
eral research support is uncertain, partic-
ularly in this period of political dysfunc-
tion in Washington. If Universities are to 
sustain their core research enterprise, it 
seems sensible to diversify our sources of 
funding. Other potential sources are the 
private sector, international engage-
ments, philanthropy, and internally gen-
erated resources. 
Third, the political pressure on gov-
ernment expenditures, like the pressure 
on private sector companies from quar-
terly income reporting, causes even pub-
lic funding agencies to demand more ev-
idence of returns from the investments in 
research. We all know this is short-
sighted but we would be foolish to ignore 
it. Increasingly, federal research funding 
programs are insisting on proof of com-
mercialization prospects for research pro-
posals or insisting that private sector 
companies be a partner in funded re-
search. 
As seems obvious, all three of these 
trends dictate that universities develop 
stronger ties with the private sector as an 
alternative source of research funding. 
Of course, as we have discovered, 
this is easier to say than to accomplish. 
Merging the different cultures into a part-
nership presents some unique challenges. 
And attempting to account for success or 
failure also has its complexity. What fol-
lows is largely a random set of issues 
we’ve seen and steps we’ve tried to take 
to address them. They are presented de-
scriptively, not normatively, since it is too 
soon to know what will be successful and 
what will not. 
The “myth” of adjusting to the “speed of 
business.” We have often heard from busi-
ness leaders how bureaucratic Universi-
ties are and how slow we are in making 
decisions. If only we could act at the 
“speed of business”.  
Of course some of this is true. Public 
accountability and regulation inevitably 
build delays into any public organiza-
tion’s decision-making. But private sector 
companies can also have elaborate bu-
reaucratic processes, particularly when 
making significant, long-term investment 
decisions. Market forces can be unrelent-
ing. A change in stock price can instantly 
alter a company’s priorities or at least 
slow decision-making. Negotiating with 
several potential partners in recent 
months convinces me that engagement 
with the private sector can require pa-
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tience and flexibility. It is also true, how-
ever, that one must be ready to respond 
quickly when a company is ready to en-
gage. 
The agreement. Particularly in rela-
tionships with companies that are ex-
pected to be on-going rather than one-off 
transactions, reaching a long-term agree-
ment can be a challenging proposition. 
Private sector lawyers, and university 
lawyers, are paid to protect their clients 
from the unexpected. Of course this is a 
non-sequitur because one cannot plan for 
the unexpected. Similarly, in longer term 
relationships, neither party wants to be 
constantly renegotiating a contract or be 
in a position where each new initiative re-
quires a new agreement. 
We have worked hard to develop 
master agreements that handle all of the 
major issues that are likely to arise. Our 
goal is a situation where, under our mas-
ter agreements, the only elements need-
ing negotiation for a new initiative are the 
scope of work and the price. Issues of ac-
countability, reporting, intellectual prop-
erty, and dispute resolution should all be 
within the master agreement.  
Indeed, probably the most important 
term of a master agreement is the dispute 
resolution provisions. You can be assured 
disputes will arise, and they can do so at 
the researcher level, at middle-manage-
ment, or elsewhere in the two organiza-
tions. We have tried to include a term in 
our agreements that specifies how a dis-
pute rises through both organizations for 
resolution. So, for example, in one of our 
agreements a dispute at a lower level 
rises to my office and the company’s re-
search vice-president. At that level we 
hope to negotiate a resolution. This al-
lows the dispute to be put in context of 
the entire array of joint activities and in-
terests.  
In a long term relationship, one can-
not look at a single dispute in isolation 
but rather it must be examined in the con-
text of the larger relationship. (My father 
was an auto parts wholesaler and he al-
ways told me that it doesn’t hurt to give 
into a long term customer on a dispute, 
even if that customer is wrong. You can 
always get even in the next transaction.) 
If we cannot resolve it, the dispute goes 
to a professional mediator and if not re-
solved there, to mandatory and binding 
arbitration. Similarly, if a dispute arises 
over the relative intellectual contribution 
to an innovation, a third party expert is 
brought in to resolve the dispute. 
Having a good dispute resolution 
process relieves the pressure to attempt 
dealing with the unknowable. In the end, 
the goal should be a relationship of trust 
where if one has to ever pull out the mas-
ter agreement after it is signed, some-
thing has gone wrong.  
Intellectual property provisions. There 
is a vast literature on attempting to re-
solve the IP considerations when engag-
ing with private sector companies in re-
search and I don’t want to repeat it here. 
These are difficult and complex issues.  
The respective interests change de-
pending on whether the research is 
jointly funded or individually funded by 
the company and the extent to which ei-
ther of the parties brings background 
technical information to the research. 
There are several models. In the ideal 
world, the parties can agree on a mecha-
nism that is based on objective criteria 
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and is essentially automatic with no room 
for disputes around valuation or likely 
commercial success. One has to remem-
ber that a private sector research partner 
may be more sensitive to the competitive 
advantage of a technology than they are 
to the market value of that technology. 
In the end, the terms will likely be 
driven by whether the university regards 
its involvement in these relationships as 
short-term or long-term. In one-off licens-
ing deals, I have always thought the Uni-
versity should be fairly compensated for 
its innovation. In longer term relation-
ships, there are often returns beyond roy-
alties that may suggest a less aggressive 
posture. And establishing a methodology 
avoids the costs of constant negotiation 
over IP rights for each innovation that is 
produced by the joint enterprise. 
Faculty, of course, have significant 
concerns going into a research relation-
ship with a private company. Since under 
our rules the faculty member is entitled to 
a share of the licensing or other revenue 
from an innovation, the IP terms are of 
personal interest. But they also want to be 
assured their inherent skill and experi-
ence is not exclusively acquired by a sin-
gle company—that they are free to en-
gage with other companies on similar but 
unrelated projects. One has to assure fac-
ulty that the University is not selling 
them into indentured servitude and one 
has to fight hard on their behalf to make 
sure this doesn’t happen.  
Organizational Structure. As I have al-
luded to, the returns on the investment in 
private sector relationships can come in 
many forms, sometimes in unusual and 
unexpected ways. This is particularly 
true in longer term relationships but 
sometimes in one-off transactions as well. 
In organizing our effort to engage with 
the private sector we have created what 
is perhaps a structure that is idiosyncratic 
and based more on the personnel in place 
rather than on any organizational theory. 
We have two separate 501(c)(3) com-
panies managed by separate boards with 
a majority of private sector members. We 
have spun off the commercialization of 
faculty innovations into NUtech Ven-
tures, a private company with a mixed 
board of directors from the university 
and the private sector. As I have men-
tioned, we also have a separate company 
with a separate board and CEO manag-
ing Innovation Campus. We also have an 
“industrial relations” unit of our Office of 
Research and Economic Development 
designed to foster private sector research 
engagements. 
In one of our negotiations with a ma-
jor international company to license Uni-
versity technology, we ended up accept-
ing a license royalty, a significant philan-
thropic gift, and a research agreement, all 
within the same transaction. And we still 
have some hope they may locate on Inno-
vation Campus. It was not rocket science 
to realize that one ought to think holisti-
cally about relationships with the private 
sector. The key is the relationship and 
benefits can flow in both directions in a 
variety of different forms. Initially we 
worried that the natural instinct of the 
CEO of NUtech Ventures, for example, 
would be to channel a company’s inter-
ests toward licensing technology and the 
head of Innovation Campus would push 
toward a physical presence on the prop-
erty. This circumstance is not likely to 
maximize the University’s interest. 
24 
 
We have created a team approach 
where all three directors get credit for an 
engagement with a private sector com-
pany regardless of the nature of that en-
gagement. We have a bonus plan where 
individual bonuses are calculated on the 
overall success of our engagement with a 
private company. It’s not clear to me this 
would work were it not for the personal-
ities of the people involved. The point 
though is that when engaging the private 
sector one ought to have multiple defini-
tions of success and eliminate barriers 
that may reduce the overall returns to the 
University. 
In conclusion, I think we are far be-
yond the question of whether we should 
engage with the private sector in research 
partnerships. I believe that is a given and 
a necessity. However, there remains 
much to be considered in how these rela-
tionships are structured, implemented, 
and assessed. Getting these items right 
will have a lot of influence on the future 
of our research enterprise. 
  
